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Abstract 
This paper proposes a new approach for defining the assumptions in population 
projections. It is based on a broad discussion and argumentation exercise which 
critically assesses the science basis of alternative arguments that relate to the forces 
which jointly shape the future trends in fertility, mortality and migration. It starts by 
discussing the results of a recent Eurostat survey among all EU national statistical 
offices in which there appears a clear consensus that the current practice of defining 
assumptions for population projections should be improved through stronger 
interactions with the scientific community. As an instrument for such interactions, the 
paper goes on to propose an interactive spreadsheet in which more than 100 arguments 
relating to the forces shaping future fertility, mortality and migration have been 
formulated. Invited experts then evaluate these arguments with respect to their validity 
and their potential impacts on the force under consideration. This interactive 
questionnaire has already been used to define the assumptions in the official UK 
population projections and with an international group of 17 mortality experts. With 
further fine tuning, this approach can be used to collect and synthesize the expertise of 
large numbers of experts for defining median assumptions and the associated ranges of 
uncertainty. It has the potential to become a standard tool for the future production of 
national and international population projections. 
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1  Introduction 
In times of accelerating social, economic and environmental changes, science-based 
information about the future becomes ever more important. The demand for such authoritative 
information often exceeds the supply of credible projections. There are many dimensions 
along which projections could be doing better than is the current practice. In the field of 
population projections, such improvements could be essentially along three lines: 
(a) Offering more detail about the stratification of the population along dimensions other 
than only age and sex. The European Commission’s 6
th
 Framework Project “Bridging 
the Micro-Macro Gap in Population Forecasting” (MicMac) has pioneered approaches 
which explicitly consider educational status, health status and household status in 
addition to the traditional dimensions of age and sex. These additional dimensions are 
assumed to cover important sources of heterogeneity for demographic behaviour 
which implies that their explicit consideration in projections will both improve the 
accuracy of the projections and provide more detailed information that is of direct use 
for planning and other purposes. 
(b) Providing more information about uncertainty. While most users of projections are 
primarily interested in a best guess forecast, there is increasing demand for explicit 
consideration of the full range of uncertainty. Traditionally, this demand has been met 
by producing alternative “variants” or “scenarios” which are supposed to cover some 
“plausible” range of future trends. More recently, however, planning agencies 
explicitly demand probabilistic population projections in order to have a 
“demographic risk function” to be matched to their cost function. In terms of future 
pension entitlements, for instance, a very minor deviation from the base line projection 
of the proportion of the population above age 65 in 2030 implies additional 
government expenses or savings in the billions of Euros. This is also the reason why 
the UK Ministry of Finance recently explicitly requested a probabilistic population 
projection from the UK Office of National Statistics in order to enter it into its main 
economic model. 
(c) Provide a better substantive justification of the assumptions made. The results of 
projections crucially depend on the specific assumptions made. As the survey of 
statistical agencies discussed below will describe, these assumptions are typically 
defined within those agencies after consultation with the experts. This is usually done 
in a rather informal way and the resulting choices tend to reflect “expert opinion” 
rather than transparent science-based reasoning which some of the users might expect. 
All of the statistical agencies state that this particular aspect of producing projections 
is the one most in need of further improvements. 
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This paper will primarily address the third issue concerned with the process of 
defining assumptions. But inevitably such discussions also touch upon the issues of 
uncertainty and that of population heterogeneity. 
The paper begins with a summary of the results of a survey among all EU national 
statistical agencies about the current practice in population projections and their views of 
desirable further improvements. We will then step back and discuss some more theoretical 
meta-scientific points about the common fallacies associated with expert opinion and 
frequently stated arguments, and the possible science-based solutions. We continue by 
presenting a new argument-based questionnaire that was used in the most recent population 
projections of the UK and summarize the results of a more extensive exercise along these 
lines carried out in the context of a MicMac workshop on future mortality trends. The paper 
will conclude with a discussion of what we have learned and an outlook to the future of 
population projections. 
2  Survey of Current Practices in National Statistical Agencies in the 
EU 
Virtually all national statistical agencies in the world as well as inter-governmental agencies 
such as the United Nations and Eurostat have been producing regular population projections 
by age and sex following the so-called cohort-component projection method. The arithmetic 
of making cohort-component population projections has essentially remained unchanged since 
Edwin Cannan proposed it in 1895. However, the way in which demographic forecasters 
make their assumptions concerning future trends in fertility, mortality and migration is always 
potentially changing. This section reviews the current practice of statistical agencies in 
Europe (EU-25) for defining the fertility, mortality and migration assumptions in population 
projections, and draws preliminary conclusions from the review. Perhaps the most significant 
finding is that all national statistical offices that replied to a questionnaire on this topic agreed 
that there is a need for improvement in the methods used to make assumptions. In particular, 
the offices charged with making population projections would welcome more structured 
interactions with the demographic research community. 
One of the first steps of the European Commission’s MicMac project was to collect 
information on the current use of external experts in defining fertility, mortality and migration 
assumptions. The national statistical offices (NSOs) of the European Union countries were 
asked to provide information on what had been done during the production of the most recent 
population projections. Each office received a questionnaire from Eurostat – designed by the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) – and 21 out of 25 national 
statistical offices returned the completed questionnaire by late November 2005. In addition to 
pre-set answers to the 12 questions, the questionnaire provided space for open-ended 
comments on each question. A complete account of these answers and comments has been 
provided by Prommer and Wilson (2006). 
The aim of the questionnaire was to assess the current status of expert involvement 
and methodology in making population forecasts by the national offices. The second aim of 
the questionnaire was to evaluate what future improvements could be made in the process by 
which experts contribute to the definition of assumptions in population projections. The 
results of the survey are presented in Appendix Table 1. 
The majority of the offices indicated that they generally use three future pathways for 
fertility, mortality and migration; some used only one or two. Only one office used stochastic 
methods to project future population. The most common approach is to create scenarios that 
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cover a “plausible” range. The involvement of external experts and meetings are clearly 
important, but there is a marked gap between “old-15” who tend to have more elaborate ways 
of involving experts and “new-10” member states. If there are problems in finding a 
consensus on values, most offices make in-house decisions after consulting the experts. Three 
offices commissioned scientific studies from outside experts for the explicit purpose of 
helping with the definition of assumptions (though one of those does not publish its own 
forecasts). 
Error analysis of past assumptions is also important. The decision to carry out either a 
systematic or a more qualitative analysis of past errors splits the respondents into two groups. 
However, no statistical office provided a description on the methodology they use for error 
analysis. Half of the respondents define storylines (either combined for the three components 
of change or for each component separately) behind the assumptions. The other offices do not 
discuss storylines. 
All national statistical offices agreed that there is a need for improvement in the 
methods used to make assumptions. Generally speaking, improvements in networking and in 
advancing the conventional methodology of scenario-based forecasts seem to have priority. 
The introduction of stochastic/probabilistic forecasting methods is not a high priority for most 
offices. It is not clear, however, if the slow pace of adoption of stochastic/probabilistic 
forecasts has to do with scientific criteria, or is simply due to the non-availability of human 
resources with the appropriate knowledge of the methodology. But there is evidence of lack of 
human recourses as three offices explicitly stated in question 12. 
In the following we will have a closer look at the answers to some of the key 
questions. Anonymity of the specific quotes given is maintained throughout the text. 
2.1  Number of alternative future paths defined for fertility, mortality, and 
migration 
The majority of the statistical offices use the “scenario” design for the definition of the 
assumptions of the future paths of fertility, mortality, and migration. That means that the 
forecasters project the future population by defining at least one development path of future 
fertility, mortality and migration. This is commonly known as the “best-guess” or “most-
likely” development. Roughly half of the central statistical offices prepare three different 
paths for each variable: fertility (52 percent), mortality (52 percent) and migration (43 
percent). The second most common situation is that the NSOs use only one future path of 
each indicator; this is the case for five statistical offices. Two NSOs generated two different 
future developments for fertility, two NSOs for mortality, and four for migration. Generally 
speaking, the 3-3-3 version is most common, but there are some NSOs that use the 3-2-2, or 
the 3-1-1 composition. Only one statistical office identifies more than three possible future 
developments of mortality and migration, while two offices do so for fertility. Using 
stochastic population projections methods is still rare among the central statistical offices; 
only one institute stated that they use stochastic forecasting. Finally, one national statistical 
office replied that it did not officially publish projections and therefore uses the projections 
published by Eurostat. 
The open-ended comments give us more insight how these assumptions are used in the 
projections. One statistical office that answered with a 1-1-1 assumption “produces 
demographic trend-calculation projection by using the so-called demographic component 
model, and does this for all municipalities”. One office made national and regional projections 
for the “low-central and high hypothesis” in their latest projections. For another, the latest 
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projections “were centred on the ventilation of those perspectives at the NUTS-3 level and 
calibrated them only on the former central hypothesis”. Another office uses the 1-1-1 
assumption hypothesis for short-term projections, but included two migration scenarios for 
long-term projections. Another NSO published the Eurostat baseline projection as the national 
variant, therefore, the answers in this questionnaire refer only to the procedures that took 
place during the discussion and harmonization of the assumptions for the three variants of 
population projections regarding fertility, mortality and migration for 2004 to 2050. One NSO 
that answered that they use the “standard” three variants (high, principal, low) also produce 
projections of a few special case scenarios, e.g., replacement fertility, no mortality 
improvement and zero migration. 
2.2  Interpretation of the range defined by alternative assumptions 
Thirteen national offices stated that the assumptions described cover a “plausible range”. The 
office that uses the stochastic forecast methodology specifies intervals (usually 95 percent 
intervals) together with the type of distribution, etc. Two NSOs did not make any 
specification in the meaning of the alternative variants. 
Some offices described the alternative variants, or how the “plausible range” was 
defined by filling in the open-ended comments: For instance, in one case the variants are 
considered as scenarios and extreme uncertainty and future international migration 
development is explained. Another NSO states that “… the high level of TFR (2.1) is 
explained by the fact that it is the symbolic value of the replacement level of fertility. As the 
baseline level was 1.8, the low level retained is 1.5 because it is 0.3 lower than the baseline 
(2.1 is 0.3 higher). It is as being the mean EU-15 level. For mortality, the various assumptions 
are explained by the expected trend of the future decrease in sex and age mortality rates 
(future trend is the same as past three decade trends / slow down in the trend at all ages / 
faster decrease at old ages). For migration balance, the level retained as baseline is explained 
as the mean level observed over the past two decades. A scenario ‘without migration’ is 
investigated but this assumption is only combined with the baseline assumptions on mortality 
and fertility and not with all assumptions (…). The high assumption on migration was 
100,000 (+50,000 in comparison to the baseline), which was considered as a reasonable value 
by experts. The extra migration balance is supposed to consist in immigration only.” 
One office defined the standard variants as follows: “These are intended as plausible 
alternative scenarios and not to represent upper or lower limits for future demographic 
behaviour. For the special case scenarios we say: ‘It is also sometimes useful to prepare 
special case scenarios, or ‘what if’ projections, to illustrate the consequences of a particular, 
but not necessarily realistic, set of assumptions.’ ” 
There are variations of the definition when we consider the definition of another 
office. “For fertility the alternative assumptions are considered as covering a certain 
quantitatively specified uncertainty interval; for mortality alternative assumptions are 
considered as covering a ‘plausible’ range; and, for migration, behind the null scenario, the 
other assumption is based on values considered possible.” 
2.3  Who was involved in defining the assumptions 
The baseline projection, or the “most-likely” or “best-guess” forecast, generally, is first 
discussed within the national statistical offices, and then discussed with outside experts (11 of 
21 offices, or 52 percent of the respondents). The second most common approach is that the 
baseline forecast is initially proposed by experts and then discussed within the office (24 
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percent). Four NSOs (19 percent) discussed and defined it only within the office, and for one 
NSO the baseline projection was defined fully by outside experts. The one national statistical 
office that uses the Eurostat projections answered that both answers c) and d) applied. Despite 
appearances, this answer is not contradictory, as Eurostat produced the population projections 
in cooperation with the scientists of the country and the Central Statistical Bureau. 
Typical comments on the procedure were: “The assumptions were drawn up by an 
expert group chaired by a member of the NSO and attended by outside experts as well as NSO 
experts.” Or, the answer b) “is closest to the … situation. However, our initial meeting with 
six … academic experts was largely based on the assumptions used for the previous 
projections and their views were part of the evidence we took into account in preparing new 
assumptions.” 
The absolute majority of the respondents (86 percent) answered that when they 
defined more projection variants for fertility, mortality and migration, they used the same 
mechanism to define the alternative scenarios. However, one bureau states that “the 
mechanism is not applied for each new forecast round for each component; this depends on 
whether new evidence is available or striking developments have taken place for a specific 
component.” 
2.4  Extent of involvement of external experts 
This question refers to the number of experts involved in the decision process, in the number 
of consultations, and if separate meetings took place with different experts for fertility, 
mortality and migration. In total, 76 percent of the national offices answered that they 
involved external experts to define the future paths of the model determinants. Of those 16 
institutes, 11 told us that they involved 10 or more outside experts; two institutes consulted 
between five and nine experts; and two offices one to four external experts. One bureau 
responded that “there is no fixed number of experts; mainly for migration”. 
The number of consultation meetings with such experts as a group is below 10 
meetings in general. Some answers are vague, such as 1-10 meetings. Nine offices recorded 
fewer than five meetings. Eight of the 21 NSOs stated that there were separate meetings with 
different experts for fertility, mortality and migration, possibly explaining the relatively high 
number of meetings. Higher numbers of experts involved and a larger number of meetings 
were mostly seen in the statistical offices of the “old-15” countries of the European Union 
than in the “new-10” member states. 
2.5  How did you deal with situations when experts disagreed 
Three statistical offices told us that they were able to agree on common values, and hence 
they did not need any specific way to handle discrepancies. In cases where the experts could 
not reach a consensus for the model input, there is no clear policy. Around 50 percent of the 
national offices listen first to the experts but then take the final decisions in-house. Only three 
national statistical offices chose the way of majority vote, and two offices applied a variant of 
the “Delphi” method. To our understanding there is a clear need in the methods used to reach 
an agreement in case there are some problems among the external and/or internal experts. A 
vote is a fast procedure and is a good tool for generating quick, democratic decisions, but may 
not be applicable for scientific decision-making procedures. 
One of the three bureaus that did not feel the need to deal with a “consensus 
mechanism” reacted as follows: “This was a common discussion to understand everyone’s 
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argument.” Another NSO that answered with a) and d) answered that, “We base our 
assumption on facts and reasoning. We try to present as much [sic] facts as possible and we 
also try to specify where we are uncertain and show how and why we have decided in a 
certain way. We also try to describe the reasoning behind the assumptions thoroughly in the 
publication about the population projection.” One office that answered that there was a 
majority vote, describes it in this way: “Assumptions are defined initially within the office. 
Papers are prepared to justify these assumptions. The experts usually agree with the basic 
assumptions.” The in-house decision choice could be interpreted as the following possibility 
described here. “The discussion on assumptions should finish by selection [of] the most likely 
variant for each component or by suggestion of verification. Conclusions from the meeting 
are implemented by NSO in calculation of official projection.” 
2.6  Definition of storylines, i.e., plausible visions of the future conditions that 
would result in certain trends 
Over half the institutes (12 or 58 percent) do not use storylines to describe the reasoning 
behind the assumptions of the future paths of fertility, mortality and migration; seven 
institutes do use them. Two NSOs did not indicate any of the listed answers, and another 
office was unsure what was meant by “storylines”. Five out of the eight offices that answered 
with yes define storylines for all three components; three of them defined consistent storylines 
to bind together at least two components. One of the three noted that they use both variants 
with more focus on the definition of the storylines for each component separately. The second 
didn’t specify, and the third defined the storylines for low fertility and mortality jointly. 
One NSO defines in detail the “binding together” of the storyline and thus provides 
insights into what probably happens in many of the NSOs. “The main variant is based on what 
are considered to be the most probable, and therefore reliable, trends for the future: a further 
fall in mortality, a slight increase in period fertility, inter-regional migration showing a 
constant probability, international migration at around levels experienced in the ’90s. In 
addition to the main variant, two alternative scenarios have been considered regarding the 
development for each demographic component. The two alternative assumptions are intended 
to define the range of variation within which the future population will develop. The scenario 
imagined in the low variant is marked by minimal economic growth and limited attention paid 
to social problems. Given such a context, improvements in life expectancy would slow down 
and there would be no recovery in the fertility rate. Regarding migration, inter-regional and 
international flows would exhibit modest levels, resulting in a kind of stagnation owing to the 
low level of attraction exerted by the destinations concerned. Such a scenario would give rise 
to the lowest projected population level, characterised by the most unbalanced age structure. 
In the high variant the scenario assumes lively economic growth, providing the opportunity to 
increase investments also in the social and health fields. This would lead to a higher life 
expectancy than in the main variant and a considerable recovery in fertility rate. Furthermore, 
this scenario is also marked by a more intense population movement among regions and an 
increase in the attractiveness of … as a destination for immigrants from abroad. All of the 
foregoing factors would lead to the highest projected population level together with a more 
balanced age structure.” 
One office describes the need to define separate storylines for all three variables: “On 
some aspects the storylines are consistent, example: Many young [immigrants] … in the 
country look for a partner in their country of origin. The rising number of young … will have 
an upwards effect on the number of marriage migrants. As marriage migrants are rather 
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traditional in behaviour these migrants will have an upwards effect on the fertility level of the 
… in the country, and of course also on overall fertility.” 
2.7  Expressed need for further improvements in the procedure for defining the 
assumptions and directions for improvement 
There is a clear common agreement among all respondents: There is a need for improvement 
to define the assumptions on future fertility, mortality and migration. All 21 NSOs answered 
that they think further improvements in the procedure are required. 
Only one office appeared to be somewhat hesitant about this choice in the 
questionnaire, but then stated: “We are satisfied with our procedures, but of course 
improvements can always be made, so we are continuously looking for improvements.” 
Suggested improvements are: “In the sense that the analysis done on the data and the 
justification of the options should be more released in the publication.” And “Everything can 
be improved. We are always open to discuss improvements. However we investigate new 
procedures carefully before we accept them as an improvement.” 
In what direction do the NSOs think the improvements should go? Here the tendency 
is fairly clear: The most widely chosen improvement options were to “have a more systematic 
review of all the substantive arguments behind the assumptions” (13 NSOs) and “have some 
structured interactions with the European demographic research community about the state of 
the art in our knowledge about future demographic trends (13 NSOs). This was followed by 
the desire to “involve more experts” (11 NSOs). Further down in the ranking came the hope 
for more exchange with other NSOs (9 NSOs) and with Eurostat (8 NSOs). 
In a nutshell, this extensive and very informative enquiry among EU national 
statistical offices makes it very clear that all national offices think that the current practice for 
defining the assumptions for population projections is sub-optimal and needs further 
improvement. The results clearly indicate the direction into which to move on from the 
current practice: Have a more systematic review of the substantive arguments behind the 
assumptions in the form of a structured interaction with the demographic research 
community which also facilitates the involvement of more experts. 
In the rest of this paper we will propose a new procedure for defining the assumptions 
that would try to achieve exactly this goal in all its dimensions. Furthermore, it would not 
only address the three top ranked directions of improvement but also, if conducted as a 
Europe-wide exercise in the future, have the potential to significantly strengthen the 
substantive collaboration among NSOs and with Eurostat. 
3  Problems and Fallacies Associated with Expert Opinion and the 
Road Toward Argument-Based Forecasting 
Given the prominence and importance of the assessment of likely future demographic trends 
in Europe, it is surprising to see how little systematic attention the scientific community has 
been given to the evaluation of arguments underlying the assumptions of future fertility, 
mortality and migration trends. While the above-described survey shows that the National 
Statistical Offices put great hope in input from the demographic research community, this 
topic has largely been confined to the described processes within statistical agencies. Since 
these offices are in a way forced to make choices on assumptions in order to fulfill their 
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mandate of producing population projections, they cannot escape this challenging task as 
easily as academics seem to be able to. 
The users of population projections – which are by far the most visible and most 
relevant products that the demographic research community provides to the rest of society – 
would rightly expect a broadly-based discussion of likely future trends to be the main topic of 
international population meetings. They would also expect governments and 
intergovernmental bodies, which greatly rely on the accuracy of population projections in 
their policy formulations, to commission major studies to make sure that they get the best 
possible information about likely future demographic trends. But in stark contrast, the reality 
shows that at scientific meetings in the field of demography as well as in government-
sponsored activities around Europe, the discussion of assumptions used in projections is 
largely absent or at best a marginal topic. 
It is important to point out here that the absence of such structured and prominent 
discussions is not due to the fact that we know all about the future. Quite the contrary, the 
sense of uncertainty about whether fertility in Europe will recover or continue to decline, or 
whether we are already close to a maximum life expectancy or will see continued increases, 
seems to be even higher than in the past. Moreover, studies on the accuracy of past population 
projections produced since the 1960s have shown that significant errors were made 
particularly with respect to anticipating the speed of population ageing in Europe. Generally, 
for most European countries, the national statistical agencies as well as the United Nations 
Population Division have assumed far too high fertility levels and far too low gains in life 
expectancy. While these two independent errors tend to cancel out when one is only interested 
in population size (fewer than expected deaths compensate the effect of fewer than expected 
births), they strongly reinforce each other when it comes to population ageing (ageing is 
enhanced by higher life expectancy and by lower fertility). One could even argue that these 
significant errors of past projections which failed to anticipate the actual speed of ageing have 
contributed to the fact that today’s societies are not as well prepared for ageing (e.g., in terms 
of pension systems) as one could have hoped. 
Given this situation, the approach presented in this paper will try to show the way for a 
better inclusion of available scientific knowledge into the process of defining the range of 
assumptions on future fertility, mortality and migration levels. In other words, it will attempt 
to facilitate the translation of the vast body of relevant research that exists in the demographic 
community as well as other related research communities into a definition of specific sets of 
science-based assumptions for projections. This follows up on earlier work by Lutz, 
Saariluoma, Sanderson and Scherbov (Lutz et al. 2000), on which the following section partly 
draws. 
As shown in the previous section, up to now this process has mostly happened through 
the collection of expert opinions. Such procedures typically follow the tradition of Delphi 
methods that have been well developed and extensively documented elsewhere (Linstone and 
Turoff 2002). But the problems with expert opinions is precisely that they tend to be 
opinionated; this can result in all sorts of biases and distortions that are not desirable and do 
not necessarily reflect the best state of the art in the field. There is abundant evidence that 
experts tend to hold strong beliefs about the future, which are at the level of emotions and 
intuitions. Hence, the approach proposed in this paper is nothing short of trying to go beyond 
opinion-based Delphi and suggest a more objective science-based way. Of course, whenever 
one has to rely on the views of people in one way or another, this cannot be fully objective, 
but one can move into this direction by making it inter-subjective and applying the standard 
scientific tools of peer review and critical evaluation. But in order to make progress in this 
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direction there needs to be something on the table to be evaluated and analytically reviewed. 
Hence, the argument-based approach will put specific arguments on the table that are directly 
relevant for the future course of the demographic force under consideration and which can 
then be critically assessed. 
The following considerations are the product of an interdisciplinary collaboration 
between demographers involved in population projections and an experimental psychologist 
working in the field of cognitive science, in a way an expert on experts. 
One important contribution that meta-science can make to any scientific approach is to 
investigate the problems in the way arguments are built in specific scientific fields. Such work 
can help the applied scientists find a more analytical way of thinking in their own fields. One 
may ask why is it important to critically inspect the argumentative basis of a science. The 
logic of the answer is very straightforward: All scientific argumentation ends somewhere and 
from that point on, the area of intuitive assumptions begins. Infinite chains of arguments are 
impossible, but we need to be aware of this and reflect on the point when we choose to end 
the chain of argumentation. This point can be right next to the object of observation, in which 
case there is no argumentative foundation at all. It can also be too far away from the object in 
which case the arguments considered and the objects are hardly linked any more. The choice 
of this cut-off point needs to be based on expert judgment. But this is judgment at the meta-
level rather than at the level of the object itself. Such judgment must be based on some sense 
of plausibility or intuition as it is typically called in cognitive science and foundational 
analysis. 
Intuitions in the foundations of scientific ways of thinking are unavoidable. We cannot 
get around them; we have to learn how to live with them. The first step in this direction is to 
understand them in the right manner. The problem with intuitive foundations of science is not 
that all our intuitions would immediately and necessarily be false, but that we do not know 
whether they are true and to which degree they are true. This means that we have to adopt a 
dynamic stance toward them. We have to turn our attention to them and carefully consider the 
possible strengths and weaknesses in them. When we understand the intuitive foundations 
better, we are able to use this new understanding for the advancement of science. We can 
open new perspectives to knowledge and justify the search for new types of knowledge. 
Indeed, the ultimate goal of such foundational work is to deepen our understanding of what 
we are doing. This is a way to speed up the progress in science in general and in the field of 
making necessary assumptions for population projections in particular. 
In the following, we will critically review some of the most common problems with 
expert judgment and the reference to empirical findings and discuss how arguments should be 
framed in order to avoid such problems. The goal is not to prove such arguments incorrect or 
empty in content, but rather to make sure that the specified arguments actually refer to 
possible causal mechanisms and are specific enough to be falsifiable. Only the evaluation of 
such arguments will add to our science-based knowledge about likely ranges of future 
demographic trends. 
An important prerequisite for valid argumentation is the clarification of what is the 
assumed cause and what is the effect. The explanans, i.e., the explanatory premise, refers to 
statements that explain the explanandum, i.e., the phenomenon which should be explained on 
the grounds of explanans. In argumentation analysis, it is always central to consider carefully 
the form and explanatory power of the explanans. 
A typical example for the confusion between explanans and explanandum is the 
assumption that something will not happen because it has not yet been observed, something 
the literature calls “curve illusion.” In this kind of false argument, one views the shape of an 
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observed curve (the phenomenon to be explained) as the driver that produces a pattern. An 
example from the field of fertility assumptions is the frequently held view that there is some 
“rock bottom” fertility level below which fertility will not fall. This is simply justified by the 
fact that fertility has never fallen below such a level in any country. There may well be good 
arguments to assume that fertility will not approach zero in the future, but they cannot be 
based merely on the description of the “curve” observed so far. Interestingly, in the field of 
projecting life expectancy, although human history has never experienced a national life 
expectancy of above the current maximum of some 86 years for Japanese women, few people 
think that future increases will be impossible. But while a historically unprecedented level is 
no longer used as an argument in making mortality assumptions, the current practice of 
(blind) trend extrapolation is not much better from a meta-scientific perspective, if it does not 
provide any plausible reasons for why life expectancy is assumed to continue to grow at the 
same speed as in the past or at a decelerating speed, as some agencies assume. More 
generally, in order to avoid such circularity of taking the explanandum for the explanans, one 
would have to anchor the argument in the world outside of the curve itself (the observed 
trends). If such an anchoring is not explicated, the argument cannot be valid. 
The circulatory problem also exists when we refer to two different measurements 
which may be affected by the same cause but do not influence each other. When we measure 
a fever in a child, we do not think that the high temperature in itself is the illness or that the 
temperature in the mouth is caused by the temperature in the armpit, even though the 
correlation would be substantial. Instead, we look for the illness in the body, which explains 
the high fever measured at both points. We know that the body defends itself from many 
different types of illnesses by producing a fever and therefore, we look for further symptoms 
to cancel out incorrect diagnoses and to find the true explanation. 
Another problem in this context of defining valid arguments is the confusion of 
differentials with causes. Much of the social sciences have been inspired by the observation of 
differentials. Individuals and their behavior differ from place to place, over time and among 
individuals. These differentials typically give rise to the formulation of explanations as to why 
the observed patterns of behavior differ. These explanations point the way to the more general 
causes of behavior. In many cases, however, the analysts stop short of providing real 
explanations for the observed differentials and suffice by describing only the differentials. An 
example for such inference from differentials to causes is when people point at the fact that 
urban women typically have lower fertility than rural women and conclude from this that 
increasing urbanization will lead to lower fertility. But this conclusion is only correct if it is 
assured that there is indeed a causal relationship from the kind of living environment on the 
number of children. There probably are such real causes, but in order to make it a valid 
argument, the possible causal mechanism has to be identified and discussed. This does not 
necessarily mean that they have to be proven in the sense of strong causality which may be 
very difficult. But at least the identified mechanisms should result in a plausible storyline. 
Such an argument can then be properly evaluated both with respect to its validity and its 
relevance. 
The same problem affects the currently popular notion of a “second demographic 
transition” (SDT). It is a name given to a bundle of observed trends in certain values related to 
sex and partnership and is by its very nature an explanandum (or a “curve” in the above 
terminology). Although SDT is sometimes referred to as a theory, it does not potentially have 
predictive power (such as stating that a country that will move into the direction of a more 
liberal attitude toward sex will have fewer children in the future) and hence must not be 
mistaken as a testable explanans. In this respect the concept of SDT also suffers from another 
frequent problem that makes many proposed patterns of explanation inappropriate as valid 
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arguments, namely, the lack of specificity or, in other words, the fact that they are too general. 
If an argument is too vaguely formulated or too broad and general in its content so that there 
is no way to potentially reject it, the argument is not helpful for broadening our science-based 
understanding of the future. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum of problems lie those with arguments that are too 
specific and too narrow. While such arguments may well be falsifiable in the sense that they 
have specific information content that can be evaluated in the light of empirical evidence and 
theoretical cohesion, they may not add much to our overall understanding of likely future 
trends because they only address a very narrow aspect of all factors that jointly determine the 
future trend of the demographic force under consideration. A good example for such an 
argument in the field of fertility determinants is a focus on declining human sperm counts. 
While there seems to be convincing evidence that in some countries there have been 
significant declines in the quantity and quality of sperm counts, and a sufficient number of 
healthy sperm clearly are a prerequisite for natural conception, some commentators have 
taken this as an explanation for the declining birth rate. But this relationship is far from 
straightforward. As discussed in a recent special issue of the International Journal of 
Andrology (Jørgensen et al. 2006), declining sperm quality and counts may well affect the 
waiting time to conception (and only in rare cases lead to infertility), but this interacts in a 
complex way with characteristics of the partner as well as the nature of the partnership. 
But the problem of partial explanations is much broader than the example above. 
Essentially all arguments about future trends in fertility, mortality and migration focus on 
certain partial aspects, while leaving others out. Hence, it is one of the most challenging tasks 
for the development of a new model for argument-based assumption making to bring these 
different aspects together in a comprehensive way in which the relative importance of the 
different arguments in determining the future course of the force under consideration are 
assessed. This will be done in the form of weights to be attached to the different factors that 
should resemble reality as closely as possible. In other words, we will distinguish between 
assessing the validity of certain arguments and their relevance in terms of influencing the 
overall trend of the demographic force. 
Based on the above-described considerations and the identification of possible traps 
and pitfalls in the specification of arguments, in the following section we will present a 
scheme of core substantive arguments that try to avoid (as far as possible) the above 
problems. These could become the basis of a systematic future scheme for defining argument-
based assumptions for population projections for essentially all countries in the world. While 
the specific formulation of forces and arguments in the following section is geared toward 
population projections in industrialized countries, it will be relatively easy to adapt the 
framework for use in developing countries as well. 
4  Specification of an Argument-Based Questionnaire and 
Application to the Future of Mortality 
Based on the above-described principles and in consultation with fertility, mortality and 
migration experts from around the world, as part of the MicMac project, IIASA’s World 
Population Program has produced a prototype questionnaire in an attempt to further 
operationalize the general approach of argument-based definition of assumptions for 
population projections. This questionnaire presents extensive sets of pre-defined arguments 
around 5-6 forces for each of the three components fertility, mortality and migration. For lack 
of space in this paper, we will only consider the mortality part in more detail. 
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The choice of moving to a predefined set of arguments that have been derived by the 
so-called meta-experts from the literature presents an important further step in the evolution 
of expert- and argument-based population projections at IIASA. The book entitled Future 
Demographic Trends in Europe and North America: What can we assume today? (Lutz 1991) 
was the first systematic attempt in this direction. It summarizes the results of an IIASA 
conference on Future Changes in Population Age Structures held in Sopron, Hungary, 
October 18-21, 1988, in which prominent demographers from Europe and North America 
were invited to summarize the state of the art in terms of substantive knowledge about the 
likely future trends of fertility, mortality and migration. In doing so the authors were 
explicitly instructed to discuss competing hypotheses and arguments. In a final roundtable, the 
authors were then asked to quantify their views about the future in terms of alternative 
numerical assumptions about the future trends in fertility, mortality and migration, and argue 
the chosen values with the substantive arguments discussed in their papers. The IIASA team 
then translated these alternative assumptions into alternative population scenarios for Eastern 
Europe, Western Europe and North America. Although this book went much further than 
typical edited volumes in pushing the authors to nail down their science-based views in terms 
of specific numerical assumptions and relate these to the text, the whole exercise was still 
largely the expression of informed views of prominent demographers. 
A similar and even more clearly structured exercise was then carried out at the global 
level. The Future Population of the World: What can we assume today? (Lutz 1994) contains 
only invited and clearly targeted papers on the three components in different world regions 
summarizing the empirical evidence, the state of the art in terms of analysis and the reasoning 
behind the definition of alternative scenarios for the future. Moreover, the volume includes 
authors on the same topics (such as the future of longevity in industrialized countries) who 
were known for holding opposing views on these topics. In a rather intensive “scenario 
definition session,” all authors had to agree on a common set of alternative scenarios 
definitions for the three components for the different world regions. It was a highly interesting 
session particularly with respect to the authors of opposing views who had to agree about their 
disagreement in quantitative terms. Again, the IIASA team then translated these alternative 
assumptions into global population scenarios for 13 world regions, the same regions that are 
being used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in their scenarios. In 
the 1996 revised edition of the book (Lutz 1996), some updates were made on the basis of 
new empirical data and a section was added which converted the high-low ranges defined by 
the experts into the first probabilistic world population projection. They were also published 
in Nature under the title “Doubling of world population unlikely” (Lutz et al. 1997). Some of 
these IIASA population scenarios were also used by the IPCC in their SRES scenarios 
(Nakićenović et al. 2000). All further revisions of the IIASA world population projections 
(Lutz et al. 2001, 2004, 2008) have essentially been based on updates of this original 
assumption definition exercise. 
The new argument-based projection approach, developed as part of the MicMac 
project, will be used for a new set of IIASA world population projections which for the first 
time will be carried out at the level of individual countries. A serious, argument-based 
exercise carried out at the level of large numbers of countries can no longer be based on a 
group of experts coming together in room. Moreover, under the past approach the choice of 
arguments and reasoning supporting the specific assumptions made was still largely up to the 
invited expert and hence contained strong elements of subjectivity. In addition to that, even 
two experts holding identical views about the future would likely present their arguments in 
different forms, which would make it hard to compare and evaluate the arguments 
systematically. This is even more so when larger numbers of experts are involved, such as the 
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17 in the mortality exercise described below, or hundreds as will be the case in the new set of 
global projections. For these reasons it was decided to move to a large set of predefined 
arguments that are derived from the scientific literature. This clearly puts the workload more 
on the “meta-experts”, i.e., the team leading the exercise, but comes with the great benefit of 
having a better structured, managed, more transparent and therefore more science-based and 
credible process. Still, individual experts have the opportunity to add further arguments to the 
list that they think the meta-experts have forgotten or not specified properly. 
When it comes to defining specific arguments about, e.g., the future of fertility, it soon 
becomes clear that they can operate at very different levels ranging from bio-medical factors 
to individual preferences or the effect of economic conditions or government policies, and 
that these levels require differential treatment. Hence as a first step in the attempt to come up 
with arguments, the three components of demographic change were each decomposed into 5-6 
presumably independent forces. The future trends of these have to be argued separately. 
Since this questionnaire has already been operationalized by the UK National Office 
of Statistics and used in two recent rounds of population projections, all reference to a specific 
country below will be for the example of the UK. These specified forces are: 
Major forces on which future fertility (F) will depend: 
F1.  The trend in ideal family size and the strength of individual desires for children as 
compared to other joys in life 
F2.  The trend in the patterns of education and work, including the proportion of time 
to be dedicated to the professional side of life (life – work balance) 
F3. Changing macro-level conditions (government policies, child care facilities, 
housing, etc.) that influence the cost of children in a broader sense 
F4.  Changes in the nature and stability of partnerships 
F5.  Changing bio-medical conditions (sperm quality and counts, female fecundability, 
new methods for assisted conception) 
F6. Changes in population composition and differential trends in population subgroups 
Major forces on which the future of life expectancy (L) will depend: 
L1. Changes in biomedical technology 
L2. Effectiveness of health care systems 
L3. Behavioral changes related to health 
L4. Possible new infectious diseases 
L5. Environmental change, disasters and wars 
L6. Changes in population composition and differential trends in population subgroups 
Major forces influencing net migration gains (M): 
M1. Trends in the main motives for international migration 
M2. Trend in migration pressure resulting from changes in countries of origin 
M3. Trend in the attractiveness of the UK as a country of destination 
M4. Costs of migration in the broader sense 
M5. Effectiveness of barriers to unregulated migration flows 
Once these major forces have been defined, the next step is to define a set of specific 
arguments that would have a potential influence on the future course of these forces that in 
turn would contribute to future changes in fertility, mortality and migration in one or the other 
direction. Depending on the force, between five and nine different arguments were predefined 
for each force. This makes a total of over 100 arguments which cannot be presented or 
discussed here because of space limitations. The arguments referring to mortality are listed in 
Appendix Table 2. It should be stressed that the specification of the individual arguments is 
still open to further modification. Hence, for each new application, the specifications need to 
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be reviewed. Such further modification will be necessary for the application to developing 
contries. 
For each of the specified arguments, experts are asked to make a judgment about its 
validity based on the scientific evidence to the best of their knowledge. They are given five 
predefined choices about the validity of the argument (“very likely to be right”, “more right 
than wrong”, “do not know/ambivalent”, “more wrong than right”, “very likely to be wrong”). 
In addition experts are given space for free format comments. 
But it is not only the validity of an argument that matters; it is also the relevance of the 
argument for the future course of the force under consideration. There may be arguments that 
are very likely to be true, but which are completely irrelevant for the question under 
consideration. Hence experts have to be asked a second question concerning the likely impact 
of each argument on the demographic component (see Table 1). 
How should one make sense of and combine expert judgment about the validity and 
relevance of more than 100 arguments? This requires a weighting of arguments according to 
their assigned validity and impact. To calculate the scores for the overall assessment of all 
arguments per force, and over all forces, the following weights were applied (Table 1): 
 
Table 1.  Weighting factors for the validity and impact of arguments. 
A Validity of argument Weighting factor 
1. Very likely to be right 
2. More right than wrong 
3. Do not know / ambivalent 
4. More wrong than right 
5. Very likely to be wrong 
1.00 
0.75 
0.50 
0.25 
0.00 
B Impact of argument Weighting factor 
1. A large upward influence on life expectancy 
2. A small upward influence on life expectancy 
3. Little or no influence on life expectancy 
4. A small downward influence on life expectancy 
5. A large downward influence on life expectancy 
6. Don’t know 
1.0 
0.5 
0.0 
-0.5 
-1.0 
0.0 
 
Assigning weights is only the first step toward a comprehensive evaluation of the 
different forces that are likely to shape the future path of life expectancy. The further 
processing of these scores is best illustrated through the exercise in which 17 international 
experts participated at the MicMac Meeting on Assumptions on Future Mortality and 
Morbidity Trends in Europe, held at IIASA September 10-11, 2007. It used an Excel-based 
interactive version of the questionnaire that was developed in collaboration with the British 
National Statistics Office (ONS) and was sent to the selected experts via email before the 
meeting. 
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The questionnaire begins with a self-assessment of the competences of the experts in 
different fields of demography. It is followed by three broad sectors on fertility, mortality and 
migration. We focus in this paper on the mortality sector. 
The mortality sector (and the others) is structured along the major forces (L1-L6) 
described above. For each of these forces, several arguments are listed that imply either an 
upward or downward pressure on that driver. The experts are asked to evaluate individual 
arguments and to assess the validity and impacts of these arguments on future trends in the 
driving force and also the relative importance of the driving forces on the future course of 
overall mortality. These assessments are stored in a database. Before the user is shown the 
overall implications of the sum of individual assessments made on the future course of 
fertility, mortality and migration, he/she is asked to make an independent assessment of what 
is considered the most likely future trend in these components. In this context the experts are 
also asked for probabilistic assessments about the future trends of overall fertility, mortality 
and migration. This information can be used later to study the consistency of argumentative 
and numerical statements given by the expert and possibly give those experts who show 
significant inconsistencies a lower weight when calculating aggregate results. 
The questionnaires on the mortality sector were completed by 17 experts who returned 
them to IIASA prior to the meeting. The resulting data base was then analyzed in the 
following way: 
Step 1: 
For each argument and for each respondent we applied the proposed weighting factors for the 
impacts and validity of arguments. The numbers in Tables 2 and 3 give the distributions of the 
responses of the 17 experts over all the arguments. 
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Table 2.  Answers on the validity of the arguments listed in Appendix Table 2. 
L1:  Changes in bio-medical technology will have: 
 Argument L1.1 Argument L1.2 Argument L1.3 Argument L1.4 Argument L1.5 
Number of respondents 
1 6 6 6 8 0 
0.75 8 8 7 6 1 
0.5 1 2 4 2 5 
0.25 1 1 0 1 6 
0 1 0 0 0 5 
L2:  Effectiveness of health care systems will have: 
 
Argument 
L2.1 
Argument 
L2.2 
Argument 
L2.3 
Argument 
L2.4 
Argument 
L2.5 
Argument 
L2.6 
1 4 1 2 0 10 3 
0.75 6 11 7 5 5 10 
0.5 2 3 6 3 0 1 
0.25 5 1 2 7 1 2 
0 0 1 0 2 1 1 
L3:  Behavioral changes related to health will have: 
 
Argument 
L3.1 
Argument 
L3.2 
Argument 
L3.3 
Argument 
L3.4 
Argument 
L3.5 
Argument 
L3.6 
1 5 4 2 2 3 1 
0.75 9 3 7 8 7 14 
0.5 1 7 2 1 5 1 
0.25 2 1 2 3 1 1 
0 0 2 4 3 1 0 
L4:  Possible new infectious diseases and resurgence of old diseases will have: 
 Argument L4.1 Argument L4.2 Argument L4.3 Argument L4.4 
1 2 2 4 3 
0.75 4 4 9 8 
0.5 2 4 2 4 
0.25 4 3 1 2 
0 5 4 1 0 
L5:  Environmental change, disasters and wars will have: 
 
Argument 
L5.1 
Argument 
L5.2 
Argument 
L5.3 
Argument 
L5.4 
Argument 
L5.5 
Argument 
L5.6 
Argument 
L5.7 
1 3 1 4 1 0 3 0 
0.75 2 3 9 8 3 8 5 
0.5 4 7 4 6 7 4 4 
0.25 4 4 0 1 3 0 6 
0 4 2 0 1 4 2 2 
L6: Changes in population composition and differential trends in population subgroups will have: 
 Argument L6.1 Argument L6.2 Argument L6.3 Argument L6.4 
1 2 1 7 3 
0.75 1 12 8 4 
0.5 5 1 1 8 
0.25 8 1 1 0 
0 1 2 0 2 
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Table 3.  Answers on the impact of arguments. 
L1:  Changes in bio-medical technology will have: 
 Argument L1.1 Argument L1.2 Argument L1.3 Argument L1.4 Argument L1.5 
1.0 3 6 4 3 0 
0.5 13 11 11 9 1 
0.0 1 0 2 5 12 
-0.5 0 0 0 0 2 
-1.0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
L2:  Effectiveness of health care systems will have: 
 
Argument 
L2.1 
Argument 
L2.2 
Argument 
L2.3 
Argument 
L2.4 
Argument 
L2.5 
Argument 
L2.6 
1.0 1 4 0 2 6 3 
0.5 2 12 1 11 10 10 
0.0 8 0 9 4 1 4 
-0.5 4 0 6 0 0 0 
-1.0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
L3:  Behavioral changes related to health will have: 
 
Argument 
L3.1 
Argument 
L3.2 
Argument 
L3.3 
Argument 
L3.4 
Argument 
L3.5 
Argument 
L3.6 
1.0 7 0 1 3 0 1 
0.5 9 0 10 8 0 12 
0.0 0 3 6 6 8 4 
-0.5 1 13 0 0 7 0 
-1.0 0 1 0 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L4:  Possible new infectious diseases and resurgence of old diseases will have: 
 Argument L4.1 Argument L4.2 Argument L3.3 Argument L4.4 
1.0 0 0 1 1 
0.5 0 0 6 1 
0.0 7 6 10 3 
-0.5 6 7 0 8 
-1.0 4 3 0 3 
0 0 1 0 1 
L5:  Environmental change, disasters and wars will have: 
 
Argument 
L5.1 
Argument 
L5.2 
Argument 
L5.3 
Argument 
L5.4 
Argument 
L5.5 
Argument 
L5.6 
Argument 
L5.7 
1.0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0.5 0 0 0 2 1 4 0 
0.0 11 9 10 10 8 9 7 
-0.5 6 5 6 2 6 0 6 
-1.0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 3 2 3 3 
L6:  Changes in population composition and differential trends in population subgroups will have: 
 Argument L6.1 Argument L6.2 Argument L6.3 Argument L6.4 
1.0 0 0 0 0 
0.5 6 6 2 0 
0.0 7 7 11 16 
-0.5 4 4 4 0 
-1.0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 
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Step 2: 
The scores for validity and for impact are multiplied for each expert and each argument. 
Hence only the arguments that are considered “very likely to be right” and at the same time 
have “a large upward influence on life expectancy” get the maximum score of 1.0. Answers 
that are either considered to be wrong or irrelevant for life expectancy get a score of zero. The 
lowest score of -1.0 is given to arguments that are considered to be right and have a large 
downward effect. 
In order to summarize the results across all arguments for one force, L, the average of 
all non-zero scores for the arguments referring to that force was taken. The rationale behind 
this calculation is that a score of zero implies that the argument is either considered totally 
wrong or irrelevant and should not be treated on an equal basis with arguments that imply 
either a relevant shift upward or downward. Those arguments are given equal weight in the 
calculations presented here, but this could easily be changed should there be a good reason for 
doing so. Table 4 gives the averages of the non-zero scores for each force by individual 
experts. 
 
Table 4.  Weighted average score over all arguments for each force. 
 Average (excluding zeros) over all arguments 
Expert #        L1        L2        L3        L4        L5        L6 
1 0.33 0.38 0.69 -0.38 0.38 -0.04 
2 0.88 0.58 0.38 0.38 0.31 0.00  
3 0.50 0.35 0.23 -0.69 -0.38 0.13 
4 0.42 0.25 0.38 -0.38 0.00 -0.13 
5 0.63 0.25 0.25 -0.13 -0.38  0.00 
6 0.50 0.50 0.50 -0.83 -0.50 0.50 
7 0.38 0.35 0.06 0.13 -0.09 -0.25 
8 0.38 0.13 -0.13 -0.22 -0.33 0.00 
9 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.13 -0.19 0.31 
10 0.21 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.00 -0.13 
11 0.47 0.25 0.20 -0.38 -0.25 0.38 
12 0.34 0.63 0.16 -0.29 -0.13 0.00 
13 1.00 0.81 -0.04 -0.38 -0.38 0.00 
14 0.34 0.30 0.16 -0.25 -0.13 -0.06 
15 0.50 0.13 0.19 -0.25 -0.38 0.13 
16 0.22 0.23 0.38 0.06 0.13 -0.13 
17 0.65 0.23 -0.22 0.58 0.19 0.44 
 
 
Step 3: 
In order to combine the effects of the different forces in jointly shaping the future course of 
life expectancy, the expert had to provide an additional piece of judgment. They were asked to 
distribute 100 points over the six forces indicating the relative weight of each force in shaping 
the overall trend in life expectancy. The software was programmed in such a way that the 
expert could not make mistakes. They were only allowed to continue to the next step of the 
questionnaire if the sum of the points given to individual forces actually equaled 100. This 
information is presented in Table 5. Table 6 gives the weighted sum over all forces. The 
columns in Table 6 result from a multiplication of the respective columns in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 5.  Relative importance of forces as stated by experts (sum up to 100). 
Expert #            L1            L2            L3            L4            L5        L6 
1 5 60 20 0 0 15 
2 30 20 20 10 10 10 
3 40 10 5 20 20 5 
4 35 25 25 5 5 5 
5 20 20 40 5 10 5 
6 50 10 30 5 5 0 
7 25 15 35 5 10 10 
8 20 20 10 20 10 20 
9 25 25 15 5 5 25 
10 25 15 40 5 3 12 
11 25 20 25 10 10 10 
12 20 20 20 5 5 30 
13 30 30 30 3 5 2 
14 5 30 35 5 10 15 
15 15 20 30 10 10 15 
16 25 35 25 5 5 5 
17 23 23 20 8 20 8 
Average 25 23 25 7 8 11 
 
 
Table 6.  Overall assessment: Relative importance (Table 5) x score for each force (Table 4). 
Expert #        L1        L2        L3        L4        L5        L6 SUM 
1 0.02 0.23 0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.37 
2 0.26 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.52 
3 0.20 0.04 0.01 -0.14 -0.08 0.01 0.04 
4 0.15 0.06 0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.28 
5 0.13 0.05 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.23 
6 0.25 0.05 0.15 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.38 
7 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.14 
8 0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.01 
9 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.31 
10 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.08 
11 0.12 0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.19 
12 0.07 0.13 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.20 
13 0.30 0.24 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.50 
14 0.02 0.09 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 
15 0.08 0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.11 
16 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.23 
17 0.15 0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.27 
Average 0.12 0.08 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.24 
 
The extreme right column in Table 6 presents what can be called the final quantitative 
result of the argumentation exercise for each expert. Up to this point the experts had not yet 
been asked to give their views in terms of actual number of likely increases in life expectancy 
per decade. This was consciously done in order to avoid the expression of a premature and 
argumentatively unfounded statement about the end result of the process which would only 
reflect a personal opinion. In contrast the described exercise resulted from a pure bottom-up 
assessment of individual arguments on the six forces combined. 
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The resulting overall scores have to be interpreted in the context of the possible range 
of scores which theoretically can go from an extreme high of +1.0 to an extreme low of -1.0. 
Table 6 shows that the individual overall scores range +0.49 (expert #13) to +0.02 (expert #8). 
In the first instance, this result implies that when viewing all possible drivers together, all 
experts expect a continued increase in life expectancy. A negative overall score would have 
implied a likely decrease in life expectancy. 
If all experts are given equal weight, the average score across experts is +0.21. This 
implies the expectation of moderate further increases in life expectancy. A comparison across 
the columns in Table 6 also shows that the experts attribute the biggest share of this expected 
increase to expected future changes in bio-medical technology (force L1) followed by the 
future effectiveness of health care systems (force L2). Of the six forces considered, only 
environmental change, disasters and war (L5) and the possible emergence of new or the re-
emergence of old infectious diseases (L4) are seen as rather minor downward risks on life 
expectancy which are outweighed by the other forces of change. 
The great variance among experts also indicates quite a degree of uncertainty in the 
future trend. While in these illustrative calculations all experts have been given equal weight, 
one can easily choose to weigh them differently based, for instance, on their self-stated 
expertise in the field, on some indicators of self-contradiction with the questionnaire itself, or 
through external assessment of status and credibility (although this can enter difficult 
territory). 
At the end of the questionnaire, after going through all of the arguments, the experts 
were asked to state their numerical suggestions for future ranges in male and female life 
expectancy in the UK that would cover roughly two-thirds (67 percent) of the possible 
distribution in 2030. The resulting distributions are shown in Figure 1 for men and in Figure 2 
for women. They clearly indicate the big difference in assessments among experts, with some 
of them being much more pessimistic than others, and some of them much more certain about 
the likely future trend than others as reflected in very narrow intervals. The overall averages 
show a life expectancy of 82 for men and 86 for women in 2030. This corresponds roughly to 
an increase of two years per decade. 
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Figure 1.  Best guesses and 67 percent uncertainty distributions about male life expectancy in 
2030 by expert. 
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Respondents' estimates of period  life expectancy for females in 2030
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Figure 2.  Best guesses and 67 percent uncertainty distributions about female life expectancy 
in 2030 by expert. 
5  Discussion and Outlook 
This new argument-based approach for providing a more scientific basis for defining 
assumptions for population projections is directly responsive to the needs and priorities as 
expressed in the above-described survey of EU National Statistical Offices. It attempts to 
facilitate the desired, more systematic review of the substantive arguments behind the 
assumptions in the form of a structured interaction with the demographic research community, 
which also allows for the involvement of many more experts. It offers an option for the future 
for all national statistical agencies in Europe and, if conducted in a concerted effort, it can 
facilitate the interaction among different agencies and with Eurostat. The UK Office of 
National Statistics has already used this questionnaire for two rounds of projections and 
further improved it. There are currently plans to use a further modified version of the 
questionnaire for a major new exercise to produce new population projections for most 
countries in the world to be carried out by IIASA in collaboration with Oxford University. 
The application of this argument-based forecasting approach is not limited to 
applications for fertility, mortality and migration. An isomorphic procedure can easily be 
applied to other demographic dimensions considered in the MicMac model such as education, 
health status or household status. It is an appropriate way to go beyond rather simple ad hoc 
scenarios in the definition of future demographic transition rates and exploit the entire body of 
existing literature and knowledge about the substantive forces that are likely to determine 
these transitions in the future. One may choose to further decompose the trends under 
consideration. In the case of mortality, for instance, one may consider it desirable to 
separately study the trends in different causes of death. This would be feasible in the context 
of the described approach although one would have to be careful not to increase the 
complexity beyond a manageable point. 
Another potentially consequential innovation of this approach is that the standardized 
computer-based format of the questionnaire allows for the inclusion of almost unlimited 
numbers of experts. The questionnaire can be widely distributed electronically and certain 
quality criteria can help to make sure that only the information provided by competent 
persons is taken into account. For this the first criterion would clearly be the ranking of 
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competence on the subject matter and the statement about the years already working in the 
field as provided by the respondent. It would also be advisable not to invite every chosen 
expert to answer all three sections on fertility, mortality and migration, but to choose only the 
field in which he/she feels most expert. It would be easy to “test” the competence of the 
respondent in the chosen field by including a few factual questions or questions relating to the 
key literature in the field to filter out those who do not know the field well enough. Since the 
processing of the responses will be anonymous, the “failing” respondents would not know 
about this and hence there would be no hurt feelings. As already indicated above, certain 
criteria applied to the internal consistency of the answers given could be used to assign 
different weights to different experts when aggregating the answers across experts. 
The inclusion of a larger number of experts who are not only drawn from academic 
demography, but also from a broader range of other relevant disciplines as well as from other 
government agencies and civil society organizations, might serve two additional important 
goals: (1) it could bring up some more unconventional but relevant information and views that 
the traditional experts do not see in a possibly too narrow perspective, and (2) it could create a 
broader public interest and therefore ownership of population projections in society. Once 
population projections are not seen as something cooked up behind closed doors by a few 
people, but rather convey the sense that a large number of persons from different segments of 
society have contributed to them, more people will feel ownership of them and possibly take 
the projections more serious in their own work. And last but not least, more people will get a 
better sense of what is known and what is unknown about the future demographic trends once 
they have to work through all the argumentation process themselves. It may also sensitize 
them as to what factors can be changed by policies and what has to be taken as given. 
This points to another possible use of the results of such an argumentation exercise 
that goes beyond forecasting and has policy relevance. It helps to prioritize the forces that 
lead to better health and lower mortality. While the synthesis of arguments as described above 
only results in a score that indicates into what direction and how strongly the demographic 
component is likely to change, it does provide specific quantitative information about the 
relative importance of different forces on the future level of that component. In terms of the 
above-described mortality-related exercise, one can, for instance, equate the overall score of 
+0.21 to the average decadal increase of two years of life expectancy given by the experts and 
then decompose the gain in overall life expectancy into the elements which are due to the 
specific forces. In this sense, the score of force L1 (changes in bio-medical technology) can 
account for more than a year of the expected future decadal increase of two years. It also 
shows that without the risk of new infectious diseases (L4), life expectancy would increase by 
2.1 years, and without the risk of environmental change, disasters and wars (L5) by 2.4 as 
compared to the actual 2.0 assessed by the experts. While such external factors may be harder 
to influence, factors associated with the effects of public health (a score of +0.08 indicating 
about two-thirds of the effect of bio-medical technologies) are better candidates for policy 
action. In this sense the argument-based approach presented here not only offers a better 
scientific basis for projections than current practice, it also offers otherwise unavailable 
insights into the relative importance of the different factors that influence the different forces 
which jointly shape our demographic future. 
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Appendix Table 1.  Summary of Answers to the Questionnaire 
 
ST = stochastic forecasts are made; M = more 
  QUESTION / 
NSO id. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1
0 
1
1 
1
2 
1
3 
1
4 
1
5 
1
6 
1
7 
1
8 
1
9 
2
0 
2
1 
1 In your officially published population projections, how many different assumptions do you have for the 
future paths of ... 
a Fertility 3  3 3 3 1 2 1 3 1 3 M 3 3 ST 1 3 1 M 3 3 
b Mortality 3  3 3 1 1 2 1 3 1 3 M 3 3 ST 1 3 3 2 3 3 
c Migration 3  3 3 2 1 2 1 3 1 3 M 3 1 ST 1 2 3 2 3 3 
2 If there is more than one (most likely) assumption for fertility, mortality or migration, has there been an 
explicit statement in your discussions about what these alternative assumptions should stand for? Are 
they considered as … 
a the most extreme 
cases that one 
can consider 
possible? 
                     
b covering a 
“plausible” 
range? 
X  X X X  X X X  X X X X    X   X 
c covering a 
certain 
quantitatively 
specified 
uncertainty 
interval (such as 
67% or 80% of 
all possible future 
paths)? 
              X       
d There was no 
explicit 
specification of 
the meaning of 
alternative 
assumptions. 
               X    X  
e Other (please 
explain).                 X  X   
3 Have the assumptions for the baseline (most likely) projection primarily been ... 
a defined and 
discussed only 
within the 
statistical office? 
      X   X        X X   
b defined initially 
within the office 
and then 
discussed with 
outside experts? 
  X X X X   X   X X X X X     X 
c generated fully 
by outside 
experts? 
 X                    
d initially proposed 
by experts, then 
defined within the 
office? 
X X         X      X   X  
4 Have the assumptions for the alternative variants or scenarios been defined by the same mechanism? 
a Yes. X X X X X  X  X  X X X X X X X X X X X 
b No. (By what 
mechanism:  a, 
b, c, d from 
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above list for 
Question 3?) 
5 In case that external experts were involved in this process:  
a How many 
external experts 
were involved all 
together? 
1
1 
1
0  5 
1
4 
1
1  
1
2 5  
1
4 3 
2
0 X 
2
0 4 
1
2   
1
2 
4
0 
b How many 
consultations 
(meetings) with 
such experts 
were there all 
together? 
7   10 4 2  1 1  5 5 4 1 1 1 ?   8 4 
c Were there 
separate 
meetings with 
different experts 
for fertility, 
mortality and 
migration? 
X  X X       X  X  X  X   X  
6 What was the background of the external experts involved? (more than one answer possible). They 
were … 
a Scientists in the 
field of 
demography. 
X X X X X X  X X  X X X X X X X   X X 
b Other social 
scientists, 
including 
economists. 
 X   X X     X X X X X  X   X  
c Medical and 
public health 
researchers. 
     X     X  X  X  X   X  
d Representatives 
of government 
agencies 
(ministries). 
 X  X X X  X X  X  X X X  X   X X 
e Representatives 
of social partner 
organisations 
(e.g., trade 
unions). 
            X    X   X  
f Representatives 
of independent 
NGOs. 
     X  X              
7 How did you deal with situations in which experts had different views about the values to be assumed? 
a This did not 
happen.     X      X  X         
b The dissenting 
experts were 
convinced with 
arguments to 
change their 
mind. 
                     
c There was a 
(formal or 
informal) majority 
vote. 
 X              X    X  
d We listened to 
the experts and 
their arguments, 
but then made 
the decisions in-
house. 
X  X X  X  X X   X X  X  X    X 
e We applied a 
variant of the 
“Delphi” method. 
             X      X  
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Please specify 
how: 
8 Has your office commissioned any scientific studies from outside experts for the explicit purpose of 
helping with the definition of assumptions? 
a Yes. X  X           X       X 
b No.  X  X X X X X X X X X X  X X X X X X  
9 Has there been a systematic analysis of the errors of past official projections in your country? 
a No.      X             X   
b We looked at the 
past assumptions 
and studied 
which were too 
high or too low. 
X X X  X   X X X X   X   X   X X 
c We not only 
studied the errors 
in past 
assumptions but 
also tried to 
analyze the 
causes of the 
errors. 
 X  X   X X    X X  X X  X    
1
0 
Has there been an attempt to define storylines (plausible visions of the future conditions that would 
result in certain trends) behind the assumptions? 
a No specific 
storylines were 
discussed. 
     X  X X X X X    X X X X X X 
b We defined 
storylines for 
each component 
(fertility, 
mortality, 
migration) 
separately. 
X  X  X         X X       
c We defined 
consistent 
storylines that 
bind together the 
future trends of 
at least two 
components. 
(Please provide 
more information 
about what you 
assumed, if 
possible.) 
   X   X        
(
X
) 
      
1
1 
Do you think you have a near to optimal procedure for defining the assumptions on future fertility, 
mortality and migration, or is there a need for improvement in the process? 
a No improvement 
necessary.               
(
X
) 
      
b Improvement 
required. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
1
2 
If you think there is the need for further improvement, in what direction do you think it should go? (You 
can choose more than one answer.) 
a Involve more 
experts.   X  X X X  X   X X   X  X X X  
b Have a more 
systematic 
review of all the 
substantive 
arguments 
behind the 
assumptions. 
X X  X  X   X X X    X X X X  X X 
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c Have more 
exchange with 
other national 
statistical offices 
about their 
assumptions. 
   X X X    X X  X  X     X X 
d Have more 
interactions with 
Eurostat in the 
process of 
defining national 
assumptions. 
 X    X    X   X   X   X X X 
e Have some 
structured 
interactions with 
the European 
demographic 
research 
community about 
the state of the 
art in our 
knowledge about 
future 
demographic 
trends. 
X    X X X  X X  X X X  X   X X X 
f Move toward 
stochastic/proba
bilistic 
projections. 
X   X  X        X     X  X 
g Other directions 
(please explain). X       X     X   X      
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Appendix Table 2.  List of Individual Arguments Defined for the 
Future of Life Expectancy 
 
Force L1 Changes in bio-medical technology 
Argument L1.1 Increased understanding of bio-medical ageing processes will allow us to 
develop effective anti-ageing strategies. 
Argument L1.2 Breakthroughs in the understanding of carcinogenic processes will lead 
to substantial reductions in mortality from cancers. 
Argument L1.3 Innovative medication will make hitherto life threatening diseases 
containable. 
Argument L1.4 Improvements in surgery including transplants and implants will enhance 
longevity. 
Argument L1.5 Unintended adverse consequences of new bio-medical technologies will 
outweigh their benefits. 
Force L2 Effectiveness of health care systems 
Argument L2.1 The cost of new treatments will be prohibitive to large segments of the 
population. 
Argument L2.2 There will be some very effective and easily affordable new 
technologies. 
Argument L2.3 Because of the growing elderly population there will be limited access 
and increased waiting times for treatment. 
Argument L2.4 Society will be able and willing to afford expensive new treatments. 
Argument L2.5 Progress in preventive medicine (screening, genetic testing) will lead to 
lower death rates. 
Argument L2.6 Better and faster medical and health information dissemination will 
increase longevity. 
Force L3 Behavioral changes related to health 
Argument L3.1 Smoking prevalence will continue to decline. 
Argument L3.2 Substance abuse (alcohol and drugs) will lead to more premature 
mortality and accidents. 
Argument L3.3 Increased awareness of the importance of physical activity will lead 
people to exercise more. 
Argument L3.4 Increased awareness of the importance of nutrition will lead people to 
adopt healthier diets. 
Argument L3.5 Increased stress levels will impact negatively on health. 
Argument L3.6 Increasing mental and social activities at old age will lead to greater 
longevity. 
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Force L4 Possible new infectious diseases and resurgence of old diseases 
Argument L4.1 There will be a growth in infectious diseases leading to increases in 
overall mortality. 
Argument L4.2 Increasing drug resistance to known infectious diseases will lead to 
higher mortality. 
Argument L4.3 Increased capability of early detection and control will help to contain 
the spread and impact of new infectious diseases. 
Argument L4.4 A major flu epidemic (avian or other) is likely to occur over the next 25 
years. 
Force L5 Environmental change, disasters and wars 
Argument L5.1 Increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters (such as flooding 
and strong storms) will lead to increasing mortality in the UK. 
Argument L5.2 Global warming will lead to the spread of malaria in Europe and result in 
higher mortality. 
Argument L5.3 More intensive heat waves during summer will lead to higher mortality 
among the elderly. 
Argument L5.4 Less extreme cold spells during winter will lead to lower mortality 
among the elderly. 
Argument L5.5 Global climate change will lead to a decline in food production in certain 
parts of the world and, as a result, uncontrolled mass migration and 
conflicts will increase mortality in this country. 
Argument L5.6 Because of the European Union, we will not experience wars in our 
country in the future. 
Argument L5.7 A “clash of civilizations” will lead to major conflicts that result in lower 
life expectancy. 
Force L2 Changes in population composition and differential trends in population 
subgroups 
Argument L6.1 The UK “golden cohorts” born between 1925 and 1945 have experienced 
relatively high rates of mortality improvement throughout their lifetimes. 
The rate of improvement in overall population life expectancy will slow 
down as these cohorts reach advanced age. 
Argument L6.2 For ethnic minority groups already resident in the UK and their 
descendants, mortality rates will converge to those for the indigenous 
population. 
Argument L6.3 The majority of new immigrants will come from countries where 
mortality rates are higher than in the UK. 
Argument L6.4 In the future, people who emigrate from the UK are likely to have lower 
mortality rates than the UK average. 
